Version 2 — 18 September 2026 · Previous version: 7 September 2026
Effective date and controller identity. This document is issued in order to discharge the information obligation under Articles 13 and 14 of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") and the disclosure obligation under Article 10 of Turkish Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data ("KVKK"), and it takes effect on the date of its publication.
Incorporation of the company behind Traknock has not yet been completed. The capacity of data controller therefore rests, as at today's date, with a natural person, identified in section 1. Once incorporation is complete the controller capacity will pass to the legal entity; the registered trade name, MERSİS number and tax number will be entered in section 1, and that change will be recorded in the version history in section 21. The app will not be published on any app store before those details are published.
This document describes only the processing activities that actually exist in the app. The retention periods, automated moderation thresholds and technical values set out below were extracted from the running source code; none of them is an estimate. No safeguard is promised here that has no counterpart in the code, and the points where we fall short are stated openly rather than concealed.
Data controller (natural person): Fahri Selçuk
Trading name: Traknock
Telephone: +90 533 598 34 09
Postal address for service of notice: The controller's
postal address for service will be entered in this field; the app will
not be released on any app store before that information has been
published. This sentence is not a
description but a binding term of this document.
Email:
privacy@traknock.com ·
info@traknock.com
Country of establishment: Türkiye
Registered trade name, MERSİS number and tax number: to be
entered here once incorporation is complete.
In this policy, "we" and "Traknock" mean the data controller identified above. "You" and "your" mean the data subject for the purposes of the GDPR and the relevant person (ilgili kişi) for the purposes of the KVKK. Plain language has been used deliberately: KVKK Art. 10 and GDPR Art. 12(1) both require that information be provided in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, so legal concepts are named precisely while their explanation is given in ordinary words.
Traknock is additionally, within the meaning of Turkish Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed by Means of Such Publications, a content provider in respect of the material it produces itself and a hosting provider in so far as it hosts material produced by users. The notice-and-takedown processes attaching to those capacities are set out in the Community Rules.
This document serves two functions at once: it is a privacy policy (the document required by app store rules and by the general principle of transparency) and a privacy notice in the technical Turkish sense (the aydınlatma metni required by KVKK Art. 10).
Under Principle Decision No. 2026/347 of the Turkish Personal Data Protection Board, dated 18 February 2026, the privacy notice and the explicit-consent text must be presented separately; giving notice is an information duty and may not be tied to any approval mechanism. Reading this text therefore does not mean that you have consented to any processing activity. Processing that requires explicit consent is identified separately in section 6, and consent for it is obtained inside the app by a separate and independent choice.
This policy covers the mobile app, the web pages under the
traknock.com domain and the server-side processing behind them.
Third-party services you leave the app for (for example a Google Play store
listing) are governed by their own privacy policies.
The tables below are the complete inventory of the data the app processes. The "Who can see it" column reflects the current state of the server-side authorisation rules — not how the interface happens to present it.
| Data | Purpose | Who can see it |
|---|---|---|
| Account identifier (the persistent user ID issued by anonymous authentication) | Linking your account to all of its records | All signed-in users |
| Username, display name, "about" text | Profile and account identification; display in chat and on the map | All signed-in users |
| Profile photo (may be a photograph of your face) | Display on your profile | All signed-in users — see section 8 |
| Vehicle details: type, colour, registration plate | Your vehicle marker on the map; matching the photo against the plate | All signed-in users |
| Vehicle marker photo | Appearing on the map with your own vehicle | All signed-in users |
| Account creation date, last-seen timestamp | Account age; the 15-minute visibility window on the map | All signed-in users |
| List of users you have blocked | Making blocking work in both directions | All signed-in users (technically necessary for blocking to function) |
| Friend list and friend requests | The friends feature | List: all signed-in users · Requests: the two parties only |
| Username uniqueness reservation | Preventing the same username being taken twice | All signed-in users |
| Notification preference (whether you receive help-call alerts) | Determining whether a notification is sent | All signed-in users |
| Data | Purpose | Who can see it |
|---|---|---|
| Latitude and longitude (raw GPS coordinates, not rounded) | Showing nearby users on the map; delivering help calls to people nearby | All signed-in users |
| Heading and speed | Drawing the direction of your marker; determining whether you are moving | All signed-in users |
| Geographic cell code (a coarse grid of roughly 22 km derived from your position) | Narrowing the "nearby users" query | All signed-in users |
| Visibility state (whether "Be Visible" is on, whether you are in motion) | Being listed on the map | All signed-in users |
| Street chat room identifier (a geographic cell at roughly 1 km resolution) | Posting your message into the correct street room | All signed-in users — this is permanent, see 7.3 |
| Data | Purpose | Who can see it |
|---|---|---|
| Full text of direct messages, sender, timestamp, read receipt | The messaging feature | The two participants in the conversation + automated content moderation (see section 12) |
| Photos sent in chat | Sending images | Participants in that conversation only |
| General and street chat messages (up to 300 characters), sender name, emoji reactions | Community chat | All signed-in users |
| Road reports: type, road name, free text, exact coordinates of the incident, reporting account | Sharing traffic, accidents, ice and help calls | All signed-in users |
| Votes on road reports and the list of accounts that voted | Community verification | All signed-in users |
| List of accounts that flagged a road report as abusive | Filtering out false reports | All signed-in users |
| Account ID and name of users who respond "I'm on my way" | Showing who is heading to a help call | All signed-in users |
| Window-knock records: sender, recipient, state, timestamp | The greeting gesture and its reply | Sender and recipient |
| Profile view records: ID and name of the viewing account, timestamp | The "who viewed your profile" feature | The profile owner only |
| Road report reputation score and penalty period | Withdrawing the daily free allowance from accounts that file false reports | All signed-in users |
| Data | Purpose | Who can see it |
|---|---|---|
| Abuse reports: ID of the reporting and the reported account, reason for the report, text of the content removed in moderation | Investigating abuse | Administrators only — entirely closed to other users |
| Automated moderation records: account ID, violation type, original text of the blocked content (up to 500 characters), its source and timestamp | Making ban decisions auditable and appeals reviewable | Not readable by any user — server-side administrative access only |
| Violation counters (sexual content, profanity) and ban record (reason for the ban, date) | Applying the automatic ban thresholds | All signed-in users — see the disclosure note in section 8 |
| Administrator action log: acting administrator, action type, target account, timestamp | Traceability of enforcement decisions | Not readable by any user |
| Device identifier hash: an irreversible SHA-256 digest of the device identifier, salted with an app-specific value, together with the list of accounts on that device | Preventing unlimited fake accounts from one device (maximum 3 accounts per device) | Not readable by any user |
The raw device identifier (ANDROID_ID on
Android) is never transmitted to or stored on the server; only its
irreversible digest is sent. That digest cannot be matched against the data
held by any other application.
| Data | Purpose | Who can see it |
|---|---|---|
| Purchase receipt: Google Play purchase token, Google Play order number, product ID, subscription expiry date, verification timestamp | Verifying that a purchase is genuine, preventing the same receipt being redeemed twice, tax law compliance | Not readable by any user |
| Wallet: token balance, window-knock and boost credits, daily free-allowance counters | Tracking paid and free entitlements | The account holder only |
| Wallet ledger: for every debit and credit, the type, amount, source, balance before and after, related record ID and timestamp | Resolving balance disputes and preventing double spending | The account holder only |
| Timestamps of rewarded ads watched (hourly cap of 6 views) | Preventing abuse of ad rewards | The account holder only |
| Prime subscription status, tier and expiry date | Applying subscription entitlements | All signed-in users |
The nature of the ledger must be stated plainly: it is a detailed record of your behaviour inside the app — which conversation you opened and when, how many road reports you filed, how many ads you watched can all be read from it. It is accessible only to you and to the server.
| Data | Who collects it | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Device notification address (FCM registration token), Firebase installation ID | Google Firebase Cloud Messaging | Delivering message, window-knock and help-call notifications |
| IP address and user-agent string | Google Firebase Authentication (per Google's own disclosure) | Security and abuse prevention during sign-up and sign-in |
| Crash reports: device model, processor architecture, memory and disk state, whether the device is rooted, stack traces | Google Firebase Crashlytics | Monitoring app stability |
| Advertising ID (AAID), approximate location inferred from IP address, ad interactions, diagnostic data | Google AdMob / Mobile Ads SDK (per Google's own disclosure) | Serving and measuring ads, fraud prevention |
| Purchase token and product ID | Google Play Billing | Verifying the purchase |
| A query carrying your exact latitude and longitude, to find out the name of the street you are on | OpenStreetMap Foundation — Nominatim service | Displaying the street name on screen and in street chat |
Disclosure — crash reports. The app writes file paths into some error records, and those paths can contain your account identifier. Your account ID may therefore appear in technical diagnostic logs. Those records are retained for 90 days on the Google Crashlytics side.
The following is stored only on your own device and is not transmitted to us. Because it still falls within the definition of "processing" under the KVKK and the GDPR, it is listed here as well:
Traknock does not collect email addresses, telephone numbers, passwords, dates of birth, national identity numbers, home addresses or payment/card details. Sign-in uses anonymous authentication. For in-app purchases, payment is processed directly by Google Play; Traknock never sees or stores card details.
The app does not collect location in the background. Background location, microphone and file-system permissions are deliberately not requested and do not appear in the app's permission list.
We make no claim to be an "anonymous app". Sign-in may be anonymous, but a photograph of your face, a vehicle registration plate and a live position held together make you directly identifiable. In Türkiye a registration plate is an identifier that leads to the registered keeper of the vehicle. All of the data we process is therefore treated as personal data and is processed under the protection of this policy.
Collection takes place entirely by electronic means, through the mobile app and server-side software, partly and wholly by automated means. No data is collected on paper.
Your personal data is not processed for any purpose other than those listed above. In particular: your location history is not accumulated or analysed, no behavioural profile is built from your activity, no location-targeted advertising is served to you, and your data is not sold to third parties for marketing purposes.
We do not process your personal data at large. Each processing activity rests on a legal basis identified separately below:
| Processing activity | KVKK basis | GDPR basis |
|---|---|---|
| Processing of account, username, profile, vehicle details and photos | Art. 5/2-(c) — directly related to the conclusion and performance of a contract | Art. 6(1)(b) — performance of a contract |
| Processing of location, heading and speed (display on the map, finding users nearby, targeting help calls) | Art. 5/2-(c) — without location the service itself cannot be delivered; this is a necessary element of performing the contract | Art. 6(1)(b) — performance of a contract |
| Processing of messages, road reports and community votes | Art. 5/2-(c) | Art. 6(1)(b) |
| Automated content moderation, violation counters, device identifier hash, prevention of fake accounts and harassment | Art. 5/2-(f) — legitimate interests of the controller, provided that your fundamental rights and freedoms are not harmed | Art. 6(1)(f) — legitimate interests |
| Crash reports and technical logs | Art. 5/2-(f) — keeping the service operational | Art. 6(1)(f) |
| Verification and retention of purchase receipts | Art. 5/2-(c) performance of a contract, and Art. 5/2-(ç) — compliance with a legal obligation (tax legislation) | Art. 6(1)(b) and Art. 6(1)(c) — legal obligation |
| Retention of abuse report, moderation and enforcement records for the duration of a dispute | Art. 5/2-(e) — necessary for the establishment, exercise or protection of a right | Art. 6(1)(f) — establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims |
| Responding to lawful requests from competent public authorities | Art. 5/2-(a) — expressly provided for by law | Art. 6(1)(c) — legal obligation |
| Processing of the advertising ID and serving of ads (Türkiye) | Art. 5/2-(f) — meeting the cost of the free tier. You have a right to object to this processing; you can switch off ad personalisation and reset the advertising ID in your device settings | See the note below |
| Processing of the advertising ID and serving of ads (European Economic Area and United Kingdom) | — | Art. 6(1)(a) — consent. Because Art. 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) requires consent for access to identifiers stored on terminal equipment, ads are served to EEA and UK users only after separate, express consent has been obtained |
Correction to the previous version. In the version dated 7 September 2026 the legal basis for location data was given as explicit consent, and the "Be Visible" setting was described as the consent itself. That basis has been corrected. The reason: without location the core function of the app does not work. Making a necessary element of the service depend on explicit consent creates a contradiction — withdrawal of consent would render the service impossible to provide — and is inconsistent with the Turkish Board's position that the provision of a service may not be made conditional on consent to processing unrelated to that service. The correct basis is KVKK Art. 5/2-(c) and GDPR Art. 6(1)(b).
This does not reduce your control. The "Be Visible" setting remains, and it remains entirely in your hands: while it is off, your location is never written to the server. The only thing that has changed is its legal characterisation — it is not a declaration of consent but a user control that narrows the scope of processing.
As at today's date there is no processing activity in Türkiye that relies on explicit consent. If any of the following is introduced in future, separate and independent explicit consent will be obtained for each, and refusing consent will not prevent the service being provided to you:
You may withdraw any consent you have given at any time and without giving a reason (GDPR Art. 7(3)). Withdrawal does not render processing carried out before it unlawful with retrospective effect.
Traknock does not knowingly collect and does not request the special categories of personal data listed in KVKK Art. 6 and GDPR Art. 9 (health, sex life, religion, political opinion, biometric data and the others).
Your profile photo is not processed as biometric data. The photo is examined on your own device, by general image labelling, solely to check whether it depicts a real person and whether it contains inappropriate content. No facial recognition is performed, no face template or vector is extracted, photos are not matched against one another, and photos are not used for identity verification. In the same way, reading the registration plate from the vehicle photo is performed entirely on your device, and the plate that is read is not transmitted to the server.
Please do not write special categories of personal data (such as your state of health, your beliefs or your political views) into free-text fields such as the "about" text, messages or the free-text part of a road report. Those fields are not designed to process such data and there is no mechanism that filters it out.
Your location is written to the server, and shown to other users on the map, only while the "Be Visible" setting is on. While it is off, your location is never written to the server — that is, no new location record is created; the map and the street name continue to work on your device alone.
Disclosure — switching the setting off does not erase your last position. When you switch "Be Visible" off, the app immediately marks your account as not listed on the map and you disappear from it. However, the last latitude and longitude that were written remain stored on your account record; they are not deleted, they merely stop being updated. Like the rest of your account record, that value is readable by signed-in users. Switching the setting off therefore removes you from the map listing; it does not remove your last position from the record.
Your last position disappears in only two situations: it is overwritten when you become visible again and a new position is written, or it is deleted together with your account record when you delete your account (see section 14.1). Clearing this field at the moment the setting is switched off has been identified as outstanding work and will be completed before the app is published on any app store. In the meantime, if you do not want your position to remain on record, you can delete your account.
While the setting is on, a location write must pass three gates:
| Gate | Value | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Minimum write interval | 4 seconds | No write happens more often than this |
| Minimum movement distance | 30 metres | A vehicle waiting at a red light does not write continuously |
| Forced write while stationary | 4 minutes | So that a parked user does not drop off the map |
In other words a write happens at most every four seconds and at least every four minutes. The coordinates are written unrounded, as the raw GPS value. Positions not updated in the last 15 minutes drop off the map.
Directly, no: the latitude and longitude fields on your account are overwritten on every write. There is no separate location history or trail collection, and no analysis of any kind is performed on location history.
Indirectly, yes — and we are not hiding it. Content you submit carries the position you were in at the moment you submitted it:
We draw particular attention to this. Every message you post in street chat records, permanently, which approximately 1 km area you were in at that moment, together with your account and a timestamp. There is no automatic deletion period for those messages, and they are not deleted when you delete your account (see section 14.2). If you do not want your whereabouts placed on record, do not post in street chat.
By the nature of the app, some data is open to other users. The list below reflects the current state of the server-side authorisation rules:
Correction to the previous version — profile photo. The version dated 7 September 2026 stated that "your profile photo is not public; it is shown only to someone who uses a window knock." That statement was incorrect and has been corrected. The authorisation rule in force keeps the profile photo open to all signed-in users. The photo is held in a separate record so that it cannot be harvested in bulk — it can only be requested person by person, as a deliberate act — but that is a constraint of scale, not of access. What a Prime subscription provides is not the ability to see a photo but the fact that the other party is not told you looked.
Disclosure — violation counters and ban reason. The violation counters on your account, and the reason for the ban if you have been banned, currently sit in a record that signed-in users are able to read under the authorisation rules in force. We have identified that this needs to be narrowed in the light of the principle in KVKK Art. 4/2-(ç) (data must be "relevant, limited and proportionate to the purposes for which they are processed"), which corresponds to the data minimisation principle in GDPR Art. 5(1)(c). Moving those fields into a record closed to client access will be completed before the app is published on any app store.
Disclosure — photo links. Images in file storage are served through a download link that carries an access key inside it. Anyone who obtains that link can open the image even if they have never used the app. Because the links to profile and vehicle photos are open to signed-in users, you should treat those two photos as effectively public. Links to chat photos are visible only to the participants in that conversation.
Your data is never sold. It is disclosed only to the following recipients, and only for the purpose shown:
| Recipient | Capacity | Data disclosed and purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Google Ireland Limited / Google LLC — Firebase (database, file storage, authentication, server functions, notifications, crash reporting) | Processor | All server-side data described in this policy; hosting and operation of the service |
| Google — AdMob / Mobile Ads | Independent controller | Advertising ID, IP address, ad interactions; serving and measuring ads |
| Google — Play Billing | Independent controller / merchant of record | Purchase token, product ID; verification of the purchase |
| Google — Maps SDK for Android | Independent controller | Supplying your position to the map layer so that the map component can operate |
| OpenStreetMap Foundation — Nominatim reverse geocoding service | Independent controller | Your exact latitude and longitude; obtaining the name of the street you are on |
| Google Ireland Limited / Google LLC — Vertex AI (Gemini model, live support) | Processor | The text of the message you send to live support and the last few messages of that same conversation; answering your question |
| Competent public authorities | Controller | Only upon a lawful and reasoned request, and only to the extent requested |
Newly added — Nominatim. In order to display the name of the street you are on, your exact coordinates are sent not to Google but to a separate service operated by the OpenStreetMap Foundation. This disclosure was absent from the previous version; the omission has been remedied. No account identifier, name or other profile information is sent to that service — the coordinates alone are sent.
Newly added — live support and artificial intelligence.
The message you write on the "Live support" screen is sent to the Gemini
model within Google's Vertex AI service so that an answer
can be generated. That call is pinned to the europe-west1
(Belgium) region; the data does not leave the European Union and the
international transfer regime described in section 10 is unchanged for
this feature.
What is sent: the text of your message and the last few messages of that same support conversation. What is not sent: your name, username, location, vehicle, telephone number or account identifier — the model sees none of them.
The AI cannot take a binding decision about you. Account closure, account deletion, token refunds, ban appeals and payment disputes are never sent to the model; those subjects go straight to human review and you are told that the matter has been passed to the team. This is not a policy choice but the architecture: the model has been given no authority to act on your account. Live support therefore does not constitute automated decision-making within the meaning of Article 11/1-(g) of the KVKK or Article 22 of the GDPR.
Retention — the present position is stated plainly. Your support conversation is retained in connection with your account so that your request can be followed up. As at today, deleting your account does not automatically delete your support conversation or the record of a request passed to a human; adding that deletion to the account deletion flow will be completed before release on any app store. Until then you may request deletion of your support record at privacy@traknock.com.
Image labelling and plate reading performed with Google ML Kit run entirely on your device; no image is sent to Google for those operations. The profile and vehicle photos themselves are, however, uploaded to file storage so that they can be displayed on the map and on your profile. This distinction must be preserved: what stays on the device is the analysis of the photo; what goes to the server is the photo itself.
Your data is held in the European Union, not in Türkiye.
The database and file storage run in Google Cloud's eur3
multi-region (data centres in Belgium and the Netherlands); server-side
functions run in europe-west1 (Belgium).
Because the controller is established in Türkiye, data leaving Turkish territory constitutes a transfer abroad within the meaning of KVKK Art. 9. The fact that the data sits within the European Union does not make it "domestic" as a matter of Turkish law.
The position under the GDPR, stated as it is. Your data is stored inside the European Union and is not exported from it by us. What does leave the Union is access: the controller, established in Türkiye, reaches that data in order to operate the service, and the European Commission has not issued an adequacy decision for Türkiye.
No transfer instrument under Chapter V of the GDPR is in place today, and we are not claiming otherwise. The app is not currently offered in any European Union member state, and the only things live are this website and a closed test build accessible by invitation. Before the app is offered to persons in the Union, the arrangement required for that access — the European Commission's standard contractual clauses, together with the transfer impact assessment that accompanies them — will be put in place, and this section will be updated to record it.
KVKK Art. 9 was rewritten in its entirety by Law No. 7499, and the new text entered into force on 1 June 2024. The regime in force today has three tiers:
| Tier | Basis | Position for Traknock |
|---|---|---|
| Adequacy decision | KVKK Art. 9/1 | The Board has issued no adequacy decision covering the countries to which the transfer is made |
| Appropriate safeguards | KVKK Art. 9/4 — (a) international agreement, (b) binding corporate rules, (c) standard contract, (ç) written undertaking | This is the tier that applies. As Traknock is the controller and Google the processor, the "controller to processor" module of the standard contract published by the Board will be used |
| Incidental cases | KVKK Art. 9/6 — explicit consent, performance of a contract, overriding public interest and others | Not available. Those paragraphs apply only to incidental transfers, that is, transfers that are not continuous; in Traknock every location update and every message is transferred, so the transfer is continuous |
Correction to the previous version — the most significant change in this document. The version dated 7 September 2026 based the transfer on its being "necessary for the performance of the contract between you and us". That basis belonged to the text of KVKK Art. 9 that ceased to have effect on 1 June 2024; today the same wording is one of the incidental cases in Art. 9/6 and cannot be applied to Traknock's continuous transfer. The basis has been corrected to a standard contract under KVKK Art. 9/4-(c).
We state the present position as it is: the standard contract has not yet been signed. Once signed, it will be notified to the Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority within five business days of the date of signature pursuant to KVKK Art. 9/5. The app will not be published on any app store before that process is complete. The only things live today are this website and a closed test build accessible by invitation.
In operations arising from Google AdMob and Google Play, data may be transferred to Google's global infrastructure, including the United States. Google states that it relies on the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework and on the European Commission's standard contractual clauses for those transfers. That is Google's own statement; Traknock is not in a position to audit transfers within Google's infrastructure on its own account.
KVKK Art. 4/2-(d) requires personal data to be retained "for the period prescribed in the relevant legislation or required for the purpose for which it is processed"; Art. 7 requires data to be erased, destroyed or anonymised once the grounds for processing it cease to exist. GDPR Art. 5(1)(e) imposes the equivalent storage limitation principle.
The following periods are defined in the app's code and are applied automatically, server-side, by a cleanup job that runs every 30 minutes. Deletion cannot be undone.
| Data | Retention |
|---|---|
| Road report — traffic | 30 minutes |
| Road report — help call | 1 hour |
| Road report — road cleared | 1 hour |
| Road report — accident | 2 hours |
| Road report — ice | 6 hours |
| Road report — warning | 12 hours |
| Road report — information | 24 hours |
| Data | Retention and criterion |
|---|---|
| Location record | Until the next update (it is overwritten). Drops off the map if not updated for 15 minutes, but is not deleted from the record; deleted together with the record when you delete your account (see section 7.1) |
| Profile, vehicle details, photos, username | While your account is open; deleted when you delete your account |
| Notification address (FCM token) | While your account is open; our record is deleted when you delete your account. Deleting the installation identifier held by the notification provider requires a separate call, and that call is not made today — see section 10 of the Account and Data Deletion page |
| Profile view records | While your account is open; deleted when you delete your account |
| Your direct messages | For as long as the other party's account is open and they have not deleted the message. Deleting your account does not remove the other party's copy of the conversation |
| General and street chat messages | The text is retained after account deletion, as part of a shared conversation; the account identifier and the display name attached to the message will be severed from the record (see 14.2 — not implemented today, to be completed before publication in the stores) |
| Window-knock records | The in-app validity period is 15 minutes; after that the record counts as unanswered. Expiry of that period does not delete the record, and the record is not covered by the current account deletion flow either (see section 14.2); adding it to the flow will be completed before the app is published on any app store |
| Abuse report and automated moderation records (including the text of removed content) | Up to 1 year after account deletion, to preserve the appeal and dispute routes against a ban decision |
| Administrator action log | Up to 1 year, so that enforcement remains auditable |
| Wallet ledger | Up to 90 days, so that balance disputes can be resolved |
| Device identifier hash | Your account is removed from the device list when you delete your account; the device record itself remains if other accounts use that device |
| Purchase receipt records | 10 years, the period prescribed for commercial documents by Article 82 of Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102. At the end of that period the record is not deleted but anonymised: its link to your account identifier is severed and only the counterpart that prevents the receipt being redeemed twice remains (see section 14.2) |
| Crash reports | Google Crashlytics default: 90 days |
| IP address and user-agent string held on the authentication side | On Google's own statement, in the order of weeks |
We set this section out as it stands, because it is the weakest point in this document. Exactly one scheduled erasure job runs in the app today, and it deletes road reports only (section 11.1). The other periods in section 11.2 are undertakings that are currently applied manually — the job that would apply them automatically has not yet been written.
Which rule applies. The controller currently falls below the thresholds for registration with the Turkish Data Controllers' Registry (VERBİS). Because Article 5/1 of the Turkish Regulation on the Erasure, Destruction or Anonymisation of Personal Data ties the obligation to prepare a retention and destruction policy to the obligation to register, no obligation to prepare a written policy has arisen for us as at today's date.
That has a direct consequence, and because it works against us we state it plainly: the "may not exceed six months" rule in Article 11/2 of the same Regulation applies to controllers that have prepared a retention and destruction policy. For a controller with no such obligation the governing provision is Article 11/3, and it is shorter: erasure, destruction or anonymisation must be carried out within three months of the date on which the obligation to do so arises. The period that applies to Traknock is therefore that three-month period, and it is the period undertaken in this document.
The erasure job that applies the periods in section 11.2 automatically will be brought into service before the app is published on any app store. Until then, records whose retention period has expired are deleted on request by the data subject or, at the latest, by hand within the three-month period above. Although we are under no obligation to prepare a policy, the periods have nevertheless been fixed in writing above and published.
Traknock operates an automated content moderation system that runs without human involvement. Because it can produce decisions that affect you, we set it out separately here.
The system:
| Violation type | Automatic ban threshold |
|---|---|
| Sexual content | 3 violations |
| Insults / profanity | 8 violations |
The thresholds differ deliberately: a user who loses their temper in traffic and writes something is not treated in the same way as a user sending sexual content.
There is a necessary consequence of this scanning, and it must not be concealed: your messages are not end-to-end encrypted and can be read by the server. Encryption exists only in transit (TLS) and at rest on disk. We do not make a promise of the "your messages stay between you and the other person" kind, because it would not be true.
If your account has been banned automatically, you may ask for the decision to be reconsidered by a human being. Writing to privacy@traknock.com is enough; we conclude such requests within thirty days at the latest.
The reason for the closure is written to the account record on the server; however, there is today no screen inside the application that shows that reason, and no separate notification is sent at the moment of closure. You can obtain the reason by writing to the address above. Adding a screen that displays the reason inside the app has been identified as work to be done and will be completed before the app is published in the stores (Article 22.4/a of the Terms of Use).
This right derives from two separate instruments, and because they do not grant the same thing we set them out separately:
Human review is therefore something we undertake of our own volition, going beyond what the KVKK requires. For users resident in Türkiye the right of objection under KVKK Art. 11/1-(g) is additionally reserved.
Disclosure. The image labeller that runs over photos is not an obscenity classifier; it filters out only the most obvious cases. We make no promise that "all inappropriate content is filtered". In the same way, text moderation relies on a list of root words and carries a risk both of false positives and of misses — which is precisely why the route of objection is kept open.
The technical and organisational measures in place:
Disclosure — token balance. The token balance and some entitlement counters are currently also held on your device and are not protected by server-side authorisation rules. This is a shortcoming on the integrity side rather than the privacy side: someone able to tamper with the app's installation package could alter their own balance. Work on a server-side wallet is in progress and will be completed before in-app sales are enabled.
No system can offer absolute security. If a breach affecting your personal data occurs:
Note of correction: the figure of 72 hours does not appear in the text of KVKK Art. 12/5; the article says only "within the shortest time". The 72 hours is the interpretation the Board placed on that wording in its decision No. 2019/10. The previous version attributed the figure directly to the statute; the basis has been corrected.
You can delete your account permanently from inside the app: Profile → Edit Profile → Delete Account. You can also send a deletion request to privacy@traknock.com.
Under KVKK Art. 7 and Art. 11/1-(e), and under GDPR Art. 17, you are entitled to know which data continues to be held after a deletion request and on what ground. The list below is intended to be exhaustive:
| Data that remains | Ground for retention |
|---|---|
| Messages you posted in general and street chat (including the account ID, the name you were using at the time, the text and the street room identifier) | The text of the message is retained: it forms part of a shared conversation, and removing one side's records afterwards would corrupt what other users read — legitimate interests (KVKK Art. 5/2-(f), GDPR Art. 6(1)(f)). No such ground exists for the account identifier and the display name attached to the message; severing those from the record (anonymisation within the meaning of Article 10 of the Regulation) is undertaken, is not implemented today, and will be completed before the app is published in the stores. The detail is in sections 8 and 9 of the Account and Data Deletion page |
| Your direct messages within the other party's conversation | The record belongs to the other party as well; deleting their copy would be an act of disposal over their data. Legitimate interests (KVKK Art. 5/2-(f), GDPR Art. 6(1)(f)) |
| Abuse reports (both as reporter and as reported) and the text of removed content | Auditability of the enforcement decision, and dispute handling. Establishment and protection of a right (KVKK Art. 5/2-(e), GDPR Art. 6(1)(f)) — up to 1 year |
| Automated moderation records (including the original text of the blocked message) | Same ground. KVKK Art. 5/2-(e) — up to 1 year |
| Administrator action log | Same ground. KVKK Art. 5/2-(e) — up to 1 year |
| Purchase receipts (purchase token, order number, product ID) | Preventing an entitlement being claimed twice on the same receipt, and tax legislation (Turkish Commercial Code Art. 82). KVKK Art. 5/2-(ç) and (e); GDPR Art. 6(1)(c) — the record is not deleted together with your account, because deleting it would disable the protection against the same receipt being redeemed again. The retention period is the 10 years shown in section 11.2; at the end of that period the record is severed from your account identifier by anonymisation, the third route permitted by KVKK Art. 7 and recognised in GDPR Recital 26. Writing the anonymisation job has been identified as outstanding work and will be completed before the app is published on any app store |
| Your wallet record and ledger | Resolution of balance disputes. KVKK Art. 5/2-(e) — up to 90 days |
| Road reports you submitted | Not deleted at the moment the account is deleted; deleted automatically within 24 hours at the latest, depending on type |
| Your account ID inside vote and flag records on other users' road reports | Remains until the report itself is deleted; removed together with the parent record |
| Your "I'm on my way" record and the window-knock records you sent | The current deletion flow does not cover these two records. The gap has been identified, and adding them to the deletion flow will be completed before the app is published on any app store |
| Friend requests | Same position; they will be added to the deletion flow |
| The device record itself (your account ID is removed from the list, the record remains) | If other accounts have been opened on that device, the record is necessary for them. The record is not open to any user |
| Photos the other party sent you in chat | Those files belong to the other party |
| Caches on your own device (chat list, nearby users, road reports) | The current deletion flow does not clear these caches. You can remove them by uninstalling the app or clearing its app data; adding this to the flow is planned |
| Crash reports | 90 days on Google's side |
For more detail and for requesting deletion from outside the app, see Account and Data Deletion.
If you are resident in Türkiye, KVKK Art. 11 gives you the right:
Under Article 5 of the Turkish Communiqué on the Procedures and Principles of Application to the Data Controller, you may submit your application by one of the following routes:
Disclosure and interim solution. Because Traknock does not collect email addresses, our users have no email address "registered in our systems". That means one of the routes listed in the Communiqué does not in fact operate in our case. To close that gap, an in-app application flow is being prepared — the "software developed for the purpose of the application" route in Article 5 of the Communiqué.
Until that is complete: we accept and resolve within the same time limits any request you send to privacy@traknock.com, even if it does not comply precisely with the procedure required by the Communiqué. This is an undertaking we give of our own volition; we will not let a procedural formality stand between you and your rights. If you prefer the written route, you may use the address in section 1.
Under Article 5 of the Communiqué, your application must contain:
Your rights under the GDPR in full, with the corresponding articles. The same rights apply under the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 if you are in the United Kingdom.
| Right | GDPR article | How to exercise it |
|---|---|---|
| To be informed | Art. 13 and 14 | This document |
| Access — to obtain a copy of your data | Art. 15 | On request, within one month |
| Rectification | Art. 16 | Directly from the profile screen, or on request |
| Erasure ("right to be forgotten") | Art. 17 | Account deletion from inside the app; for what remains see section 14.2 |
| Restriction of processing | Art. 18 | On request |
| Notification of rectification, erasure or restriction to recipients | Art. 19 | Carried out by us; the recipients are listed in section 9 |
| Data portability | Art. 20 | See the note below |
| Objection — to processing based on legitimate interests | Art. 21 | On request; for objecting to processing of the advertising ID you may also use your device settings |
| Human intervention, expression of your point of view and contestation in relation to automated decisions | Art. 22(3) | See section 12.1 |
| Withdrawal of consent | Art. 7(3) | For processing based on consent, at any time and without giving reasons |
| Complaint to a supervisory authority | Art. 77 | To the data protection authority of your member state; in the United Kingdom, the Information Commissioner's Office |
Response times (Art. 12(3)). We provide information on the action taken on a request under Articles 15 to 22 without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt. Where necessary, taking into account the complexity and number of requests, that period may be extended by two further months; in that case we inform you of the extension, together with the reasons for the delay, within one month of receipt of the request.
On data portability (Art. 20). On request, your data is prepared as a structured, commonly used and machine-readable file covering your username, profile details, vehicle details, road reports, chat messages and wallet ledger. This work is currently done by hand; there is no automated export tool yet. The period may therefore be extended within the limits permitted by GDPR Art. 12(3), and you will be told if it is, together with the reasons.
Representative in the Union (GDPR Art. 27) — present position. The controller is established in Türkiye. The app is not currently published in any European Union member state and no service is being offered to persons in the Union, so the conditions in GDPR Art. 3(2) that would trigger the obligation are not met today. If the EU market is entered, a representative in the Union will be designated in writing pursuant to Art. 27 and their identity will be entered in this document. The consent layer required by the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR (Google's User Messaging Platform) was added to the code on 21 September 2026 — a user in the EEA/UK is shown a separate consent form before seeing any advertising, and can change that choice later via "Ad privacy choices" in the app (see section 6).
As a California resident you have the right to know what personal information is collected about you and how it is used (Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100), to request its deletion (§ 1798.105), to request its correction (§ 1798.106), to opt out of the sale or sharing of your personal information (§ 1798.120), to limit the use and disclosure of sensitive personal information (§ 1798.121), and not to be discriminated against for exercising any of these rights (§ 1798.125).
We do not sell your personal information, and we do not knowingly sell or share the personal information of consumers under 16 years of age. The advertising ID used to serve ads may nevertheless fall within the CCPA definition of "sharing" for cross-context behavioural advertising. You can switch off ad personalisation or reset the advertising ID in your device settings; Prime subscribers are shown no ads at all. Requests: privacy@traknock.com.
Sensitive personal information. Precise geolocation is treated as sensitive personal information under the CCPA as amended by the CPRA (Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140). We use your precise geolocation only to provide the service you asked for — showing nearby users, routing help calls and naming the street you are on — and not to infer characteristics about you. It is not used for profiling, is not sold, and is not disclosed for cross-context behavioural advertising.
Disclosure — applicability. Traknock does not currently meet the revenue and volume thresholds that make an undertaking a "business" within the meaning of the CCPA, and the app is not yet published in the United States. We nevertheless grant the rights set out above to California residents as a matter of policy, and we will meet the CCPA/CPRA obligations in full, including any required opt-out mechanism, before the app is offered in California.
Traknock is a service directed at adult users. The target audience declared in the app store will be "older users".
The age limit of 15 in Türkiye — 1 November 2026. Under Additional Article 4/7 of Law No. 5651, inserted by Law No. 7578, social network providers may not offer their service to children who have not completed fifteen years of age and are obliged to take the necessary measures, including age verification, to ensure that the service is not provided to them. That provision enters into force on 1 November 2026.
Because Traknock enables users to create and share text, image and location content, it falls within the statutory definition of a social network provider. The minimum age applied in Türkiye is therefore 15: the sign-up screen asks for a date of birth, and a declaration showing an age under 15 blocks account creation. A user who declares being between 15 and 17 is also asked for a separate declaration that they are using the app with the knowledge and permission of a parent or guardian (added on 21 September 2026) — this is a minimum stand-in for the actual parental control tool required by Additional Article 4/20 of the same Law, not that tool itself; the real tool will be added to the app before it is published on any app store. Article 5.1 of the Terms of Use already sets the minimum age for Türkiye at 15; the two documents agree on this point.
We are not hiding the present position: the age check at sign-up is a self-declaration check, not an official identity-based verification. The Law envisions an age-verification method that runs through e-Devlet (the Turkish e-Government gateway), whose exact mechanics are left to a BTK regulation that has not yet been published; once it is, we will adapt this flow to it. The actual parental control tool does not exist today. Because the app is not published on any app store, these gaps do not create an actual risk to users today; they will be closed before publication.
In the European Union, if you are below the age limit set by your country under GDPR Art. 8 (between 13 and 16), you may use the app only with the consent of a parent or guardian. In the United States, the app is not directed at children under 13 within the meaning of COPPA and we do not knowingly collect their data.
If we become aware that a child below the applicable age limit has provided data, we delete the record. You can report such a case to privacy@traknock.com; on receiving the report we suspend the account and conclude our review within thirty days.
| Permission | Why it is requested |
|---|---|
| Location (while the app is in use) | Showing your position, nearby users and the street you are on |
| Camera | Taking your profile photo and your vehicle marker photo |
| Photo library | Choosing a profile photo, a vehicle photo and photos to send in chat |
| Notifications | Message, window-knock and nearby help-call alerts |
Background location permission is not requested. Microphone, file-system and foreground-service permissions are likewise deliberately not requested. All permissions are optional and can be withdrawn from device settings at any time. Without location permission the map features do not work; without the others, only the related feature is disabled.
Note of correction: the previous version stated that camera permission was also requested in order to send photos in chat. The correct position is that photos sent in chat are chosen from the gallery; the camera is used only for profile and vehicle photos.
This website uses no cookies and carries no tracking scripts or analytics. The pages consist of text and a stylesheet only. No separate cookie policy has therefore been published.
The mobile app uses no cookies either, but the absence of cookies is not on its own a sufficient safeguard: the advertising ID (AAID) and local storage on the device fall within the "access to information stored in terminal equipment" rule in Art. 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) in the European Union, and within the equivalent rule in the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 in the United Kingdom. Ads will therefore be served to EEA and UK users only after separate, express consent has been obtained (see section 6).
If this policy is updated, the version number and date at the top of this page change. Significant changes are announced inside the app; where a change broadens the scope of processing and requires explicit consent, your consent is additionally sought separately for each such change. Information provided in discharge of the notice obligation is in no case tied to a consent checkbox.
| Version | Date | Principal changes |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 18 September 2026 | The basis for international transfer was corrected to a standard contract under Art. 9/4-(c), in line with the version of KVKK Art. 9 that entered into force on 1 June 2024. The legal basis for location data was changed from explicit consent to performance of a contract under Art. 5/2-(c) and GDPR Art. 6(1)(b). The incorrect statement about the visibility of the profile photo was corrected. The data inventory was completed by auditing the whole app; the wallet ledger, purchase records, the location trace left by street chat, the Nominatim transfer, the IP logging performed by Firebase Authentication and the data that stays on the device were added. A complete list of what remains after account deletion was added. The application procedure was rewritten in line with Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Communiqué on the Procedures and Principles of Application to the Data Controller. The 72-hour breach notification was attributed to the Board's decision No. 2019/10. The difference between KVKK Art. 11/1-(g) and GDPR Art. 22(3) was separated out in the automated decision-making section. Sections on the capacities held under Law No. 5651, the age limit of 15 and periodic erasure were added. The purpose for which camera permission is requested was corrected. The GDPR, UK and California sections were expanded. A legal review carried out the same day produced the following corrections: it is now explained that the last position written remains on the account record after "Be Visible" is switched off (sections 7.1 and 8); the periodic erasure period was corrected to the three months that Article 11/3 of the Regulation imposes on a controller with no obligation to prepare a retention and destruction policy; the contradiction between the retention period for purchase receipts and the statement that they "cannot be deleted" was resolved by reference to Article 82 of the Turkish Commercial Code and an undertaking to anonymise them at the end of that period; the article number for the proportionality principle was corrected from Art. 4/1-(ç) to Art. 4/2-(ç). A consistency check across the whole set the same evening closed four further gaps: the marker used for a masked message was corrected to [kaldirildi], the value the app actually writes; the undertaking to sever the account link from room chat messages was carried into sections 11 and 14.2 in the same form as on the Account and Data Deletion page; it was added that deleting the notification address held by the provider requires a separate call; and it was stated in section 12.1 that the reason for an account closure is not shown inside the app today. |
| 1 | 7 September 2026 | First published version. |
For any privacy question, request or data subject application:
privacy@traknock.com
For general matters:
info@traknock.com
For the postal address for written applications and the telephone number, see
section 1.
To apply or complain directly to the Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority: kvkk.gov.tr